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Legal Notes
Harold Dudley Greeley, Editor
RESPONSIBILITY IN LIMITED AUDITS

In The Journal of Accountancy for February, 1933, the Canadian case of
International Laboratories, Ltd. v. Dewar, et al, (1932) 3 Western Weekly Re
ports 174, was discussed. This was a decision by the Manitoba court of king’s
bench, a lower court, allowing plaintiff, a manufacturer, to recover from de
fendants, its auditors, approximately $27,000, the amount of defalcations by
plaintiff’s chief accountant over a period of nearly four years, and denying
defendants any recovery on a counterclaim for fees for making a supplemental
audit after some of the thefts had been uncovered. The Manitoba court of
appeal has just reversed the lower court, dismissing the plaintiff’s action and
allowing defendants’ counterclaim. (1933) 2 Western Weekly Reports 529.
The matter was of such importance that every one of the five judges in the
court of appeal wrote an opinion. It is understood that an appeal will be
taken to the privy council.
The chief point at issue was whether or not the auditors were liable for
negligence in view of the limited scope of the audit called for by the contract
under which they were working, and in view also of plaintiff’s own negligence
with respect at least to some of the thefts. An incidental point discussed, but
which did not need to be and was not decided, concerned the measure of dam
ages which would have applied if the auditors had been found negligent. An
interesting fact in the case was an ingenious and novel way of altering bank
statements used, and probably invented by, the defaulter.
The plaintiff corporation was organized in 1920. Its largest stockholder was
Marshall-Wells Company of Duluth, and some years after its incorporation
Marshall-Wells Company, certain officers of the plaintiff, and the auditors
agreed that future audits, for a reduced fee, were to be annual instead of
monthly and were to be limited especially to receipts and disbursements of cash,
and to transactions in notes and securities, with special attention to payrolls and
freight charges and other expenses. Audits were to be made principally to
certify to balance-sheets used for credit purposes and the certificate was to be
made in the form required by the companies act (R. S. C. 1927, ch. 27, sec. 124).
With respect to that, the law has been understood to require only that auditors
ascertain the true financial condition of the company and that, unless their
suspicions be aroused, ordinary auditing procedures and checks are sufficient
(Stiebel’s Company Law, 3rd ed. p. 370). Under the rule stated in In re Kings
ton Cotton Mills Co. (No. 2), (1896) 2 Ch. 279, 65 L. J. Ch. 673, auditors can
not be held liable for not tracking down ingenious and carefully laid schemes
of fraud when there is nothing to arouse their suspicion and when those frauds
have been perpetrated for years by tried servants of the company without de
tection by the directors. In the present case, the auditors explained to the
plaintiff and its stockholder that the type of audit to be adopted would not
necessarily disclose irregularities in the accounts but plaintiff stated that its
system of internal check obviated the necessity of a complete audit.
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The defaulting employee acted as office manager and general bookkeeper,
supervised all the clerical work, opened the mail, handled all the incoming and
outgoing cash, drew the cheques and saw to the posting of the books. He had
the entire confidence of plaintiff’s manager whose time was devoted partly to
supervising the manufacturing plant and partly to selling in the field. Simi
larly he had the entire confidence of plaintiff’s treasurer who had his office with
Marshall-Wells Company. The signatures of both the manager and the
treasurer were required on plaintiff’s cheques, but apparently each would and
did sign any cheque which the defaulting accountant gave him, with or without
supporting vouchers. It was their negligence in this respect which made the
largest thefts possible. The court commented on it by saying, “A client must
be expected to look after his own business and see that he gets paid for what he
sells. ... It is his business, not the auditor’s, to do these things . . . the
client should not pay for purchases which he has not received. . . . The man
agement of the plaintiff company in carrying out their duties were in a much
better position to discover the frauds than were the defendants.” The thefts
through petty cash “ could not have happened if the plaintiffs had adopted the
imprest system as defendants advised them to do.” If plaintiff’s system of
internal check had been carried out, neither error nor fraud could have escaped
detection. Thus negligence on the part of plaintiff’s officers was a proximate
cause of the loss and the court cited Craig v. Anyon, 212 App. Div. (N. Y.) 55,
208 N. Y. S. 259, as authority for denying recovery for losses to which plaintiff
directly contributed by its own negligence.
The court held, with one judge dissenting in part, that defendants were not
negligent in performing their work under the contract which limited the scope
of the audit. “The measure of the responsibility of auditors depends on the
terms of the employment in the particular case.” The parties here did not
contemplate the assumption by defendants of the obligations sought to be im
posed on them, or, in other words, this loss was not a consequence presumed
to have been contemplated by the parties. “The footing of additions, in
itself a well-nigh interminable task, would have disclosed that peculations and
manipulations were taking place and a vast amount of cross-checking of entries
would have had the like result. ... A complete audit or very extensive checks
would have protected the plaintiff. Nothing less would.” Defendants did all
that they were required to do and they used reasonable care and skill in per
forming their work. There was nothing to arouse suspicion of this completely
trusted employee, especially in view of the fact that both the manager and the
treasurer had to sign cheques and personally to certify to the correctness of the
bank account. “With such safeguards they (the auditors) might quite prop
erly accept any reasonable explanations given in answer to enquiries.”
The defaulter was resourceful and also progressive. In his first year and
until he made certain that defendants’ limited plan of auditing was not apt to
bother him, he stole only $518.09. Then he proceeded with assurance and
during the next three years his gross per annum became respectively $3,401.55,
$8,008.58 and $14,799.07. Some of his methods were elementary and simple.
For example, when an employee purchased merchandise the defaulter would
intercept the delivery slip, thus forestalling the preparation of an invoice and
entry of the sale as an account receivable, and then substitute a receipted bill
in the employee’s pay envelope for the equivalent amount of cash. But he had
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one ingenious plan which on only four transactions produced $13,282.75 for
him. He had noticed that the bank statements showed a very considerable
number of correction entries during the year and that it was the bank’s practice
to note these corrections by marking each erroneous debit and credit on the
statement “EC ”, meaning error corrected. He had noticed also that when he
had a cheque certified, the bank’s statement would show the debit for it marked
“C C”, meaning certified cheque. He thereupon evolved the following plan:
Upon receipt of a large cheque, for instance from Marshall-Wells Company, for
merchandise sold, he would deposit it without entry in the cashbook, but he
would credit the customer’s account, keeping his books in balance by false
additions or footings. He would immediately draw a cheque for the exact
amount of the deposit to the order of a fictitious payee and get the manager and
treasurer to sign it on his oral representation that it was a payment to a creditor.
He then would have this cheque certified, endorse the name of the fictitious
payee and use it. The next bank statement would have the debit for this
cheque marked C C and he would alter this to E C and mark the credit for the
unrecorded deposit EC. A heavy pencil line through both the debit and the
credit would call the auditors' attention to them as correction entries. That
this explanation was reasonable was shown by the fact that during the period
under audit there were 30 such cross-entries, of which 26 were genuine. “ Un
less the defendants were on the look-out for crime or had come upon suspicious
circumstances that would have created distrust of (the defaulter), they properly
could attach no significance to the cross-entries in question.”
One of the judges in his written opinion agreed with the other judges on all
points except that he thought defendants had been negligent in not uncovering
the thefts through petty cash because the auditors' contract expressly required
them to check cash and deposits. He also would have dismissed defendants’
counterclaim because if the auditors had done their work properly the thefts
would have been uncovered at once and no supplemental audit would have been
necessary.
He based his finding of negligence partly on the fact that the defaulter put
cash receipts of large amount into petty cash and held them there sometimes
for weeks. The balance in petty cash occasionally amounted to $3,000, and
bank deposits subsequently made bore no relation to the amounts placed in petty
cash ostensibly pending deposit. In his opinion these facts should have led
the auditors to investigate. He would hold the auditors liable for the petty
cash thefts because they were “ losses which fall within the four corners of their
contract.” He concurred with the other judges that defendants should not
be held for losses not covered by the contract. When an auditor makes an
honest blunder, his liability for negligence should not expose him to claims of an
indeterminate amount, for an indeterminate time, and to an indeterminate
class. His liability should be bounded by the contract and enforceable only
by the parties to it. He cited Ultramares Corporation v. Touche, 255 N. Y. 170
to support his position as to liability for negligence, distinguished from a
liability for deceit. He distinguished Canadian Woodmen of the World v.
Hooper, (1933) 1 D. L. R. 168 on the ground that the liability there was for
misconduct in not reporting irregularities. He would hold the present defend
ants for damages only “for the loss which has proceeded directly and proxi
mately from (their) negligence.”
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The most interesting feature of this dissenting opinion is its position on the
measure of damages. Because this judge found defendants negligent he was
obliged to prescribe a rule for determining the dollar amount of their liability;
since the four other judges found no negligence, the question of damages was
not before them for decision, although two of them did comment on the topic.
The dissenting judge denied that damages could be limited to a recovery of the
fees paid to the auditors, but he did limit them to losses due to thefts which it
was the auditor’s duty to uncover and which they had failed to uncover. The
auditors were not to be held for subsequent thefts, despite the argument that
such thefts would not have occurred had the first ones been uncovered because
in that event the plaintiff would have discharged the defaulter.
One of the four judges in the majority laid down a rule of damages which is
eminently fair. He held that if the defendants had been liable, their liability
would have extended only to such sums as the plaintiff, because of non-com
munication by the defendants, had been prevented from recovering from the
defaulter or on his fidelity insurance. “ It was not a question of liability for loss
from the employees’ misconduct but of what could be done to retrieve that
loss.” He held that there would have been no liability here because plaintiff
had lost no rights against the insurance underwriter and had not shown that
the delay had caused plaintiff to lose any rights to reach property belonging to
the defaulter.
The opinion of the chief justice somewhat weakens this statement of the
measure of damages. He writes: “In view of the conclusion I have reached
with the majority of the court, I will not consider the question whether, if negli
gence had been found, the defendants’ liability would only be for the amount
which the plaintiffs could have recovered from (the defaulter) had they been
duly warned. I would only say that such limitation does not seem to accord
with the general principles of the law of damages as we have it here, although it
seems to have recognition in special cases in some of the United States courts.”
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